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Abstract. Agent interactions where the agents hold conflicting goals could be
modelled as adversarial argumentation games. In many real-life situations (e.g.,
criminal litigation, consumer legislation), due to ethical, moral or other principles
governing interaction, the burden of proof, i.e., which party is to lose if the evi-
dence is balanced [21], is a priori fixed to one of the parties. Analogously, when
resolving disputes in a heterogeneous agent-system the unequal importance of
different agents for carrying out the overall system goal need to be accounted for.
In this paper we present an asymmetric protocol for an adversarial argumentation
game in Defeasible Logic, suggesting Defeasible Logic as a general representa-
tion formalism for argumentation games modelling agent interactions.
1 Introduction
Adversarial situations arise when agents in pursuit of their goals interact with other
agents pursuing goals of a conflicting nature. In a setting where issues need to be re-
solved, the agent interaction could be modelled as an adversarial argumentation game.
Argumentation games are defeasible, meaning that an argument put forward by one of
the agents in support of a conclusion could be defeated by contrary evidence and ar-
guments put forward by the other agent. Thus, the agents are to resolve the dispute by
putting forward the arguments that will enable the best outcome for their cases. Using
a symmetrical protocol an argumentation game between homogeneous (equally strong)
parties could be modelled. However, as in many real-life settings, also in agent systems
disputes arise where the claims of the agents involved in the interaction (e.g., regarding
distribution of a scarce resource) are of unequal importance to the overall goal of the
agent system, and thus need to be handled accordingly. In addition, as in many real-
life situations the evidence presented by the parties of a dispute may be inconclusive
and the accompanying arguments incoherent. Thus, a majority of the disputes has to be
resolved by higher-level principles guiding the interaction. One important principle is
referred to as the burden of proof, cf. e.g. [21].
To accommodate for a correct outcome of argumentation games in heterogeneous
agent systems, we present an asymmetric protocol for adversarial argumentation games.
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The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present argumentation games and
their setup. In Section 3 we highlight the most relevant features of defeasible logic. We
discuss the formalization of argumentation games using defeasible logic as presented
in [24] in Section 4. Section 5 presents the asymmetrical protocol for argumentation
games. We use a criminal litigation setting to illustrate and discuss some of the benefits
of the model. Section 6 presents some related work. In Section 7 we conclude.
2 Argumentation Games
Consider an adversarial argumentation (dialogue) game as an interaction between two
parties, the Proponent and the Opponent. The two parties debate over a topic. Each
equipped with a set of arguments the parties take turn in putting forward a subset of
these arguments, i.e., move, with the sole purpose of justifying their claim. The game is
governed by a protocol for admissible moves and the winning conditions. For the pro-
ponent a basic protocol for an argumentation game is that the arguments of the move
attack the previous move of the adversary, and that the main claim follows from the ar-
guments assessed as currently valid. For the opponent goes that an admissible move has
to attack the previous move of the adversary, and that the main claim is not derivable.
Even though more complex winning criteria could be devised, by a basic protocol, a
player wins the argumentation game when the other party is out of admissible moves.
3 Defeasible Logic
Defeasible Logic (DL) [17,1] is a simple, flexible, rule based non-monotonic formalism
able to capture different and sometimes incompatible facets of non-monotonic reason-
ing [2], and efficient and powerful implementations have been proposed [16,11].
Knowledge in DL can be represented in two ways: facts and rules. Facts are repre-
sented either in form of states of affairs (literal and modal literal) and actions that have
been performed. Facts are represented by predicates. For example, “Tweety is a pen-
guin” is represented by Penguin(Tweety). A rule describes the relationship between a
set of literals (premises) and a literal (conclusion), and we can specify how strong the re-
lationship is. As usual rules allow us to derive new conclusions given a set of premises.
We distinguish between strict rules, defeasible rules and defeaters represented, respec-
tively, by expressions of the form A1, . . . ,An→ B, A1, . . . ,An⇒ B and A1, . . . ,An; B,
where A1, . . . ,An is a possibly empty set of prerequisites (causes) and B is the conclu-
sion (effect) of the rule. We only consider rules that are essentially propositional. Rules
containing free variables are interpreted as the set of their ground instances.
Strict rules are rules in the classical sense: whenever the premises are indisputable
then so is the conclusion. Thus they can be used for definitional clauses. An example of
a strict rule is “Penguins are birds”, formally: Penguin(X)→ Bird(X).
Defeasible rules are rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence. An example of
such a rule is “Birds usually fly”: Bird(X)⇒ Fly(X). The idea is that if we know that
X is a bird, we may conclude that X can fly unless other evidence suggest she may not.
Defeaters are a special kind of rules. They are used to prevent conclusions, not to
support them. For example: Heavy(X); ¬Fly(X). This rule states that if something is
heavy then it might not fly. This rule can prevent the derivation of a “fly” conclusion.
On the other hand it cannot be used to support a “not fly” conclusion.
DL is a “skeptical” non-monotonic logic, meaning that it does not support contra-
dictory conclusions. Instead DL seeks to resolve conflicts. In cases where there is some
support for concluding A but also support for concluding ¬A, DL does not conclude
either of them (thus the name “skeptical”). If the support for A has priority over the
support for ¬A then A is concluded. No conclusion can be drawn from conflicting rules
in DL unless these rules are prioritized. The superiority relation among rules is used
to define priorities among rules, that is, where one rule may override the conclusion of
another rule. For example, given the defeasible rules
r : Bird(X)⇒ Fly(X) r′ : Penguin(X)⇒¬Fly(X)
which contradict one another, no conclusive decision can be made about whether a
Tweety can fly or not. But if we introduce a superiority relation  with r′  r, then we
can indeed conclude that Tweety cannot fly since it is a penguin.
We now give a short informal presentation of how conclusions are drawn in DL.
Let D be a theory in DL (i.e., a collection of facts, rules and a superiority relation). A
conclusion of D is a tagged literal and can have one of the following four forms:
+∆q meaning that q is definitely provable in D (i.e., using only facts and strict rules).
−∆q meaning that we have proved that q is not definitely provable in D.
+∂q meaning that q is defeasibly provable in D.
−∂q meaning that we have proved that q is not defeasibly provable in D.
Strict derivations are obtained by forward chaining of strict rules, while a defeasible
conclusion p can be derived if there is a rule whose conclusion is p, whose prerequisites
(antecedent) have either already been proven or given in the case at hand (i.e., facts),
and any stronger rule whose conclusion is ¬p has prerequisites that fail to be derived.
Formally a DL theory (as formalized by [4]) is a structure D = (F,R,) where F
is a finite set of factual premises, R a finite set of rules, and  a superiority relation
on R. Given a set R of rules, we denote the set of all strict rules in R by Rs, the set of
strict and defeasible rules in R by Rsd , the set of defeasible rules in R by Rd , and the
set of defeaters in R by Rd f t . R[q] denotes the set of rules in R with consequent q. In
the following ∼p denotes the complement of p, that is, ∼p is ¬q if p = q, and ∼p is q
if p is ¬q. For a rule r we will use A(r) to indicate the body or antecedent of the rule
and C(r) for the head or consequent of the rule. A rule r consists of its antecedent A(r)
(written on the left; A(r) may be omitted if it is the empty set) which is a finite set of
literals, an arrow, and its consequent C(r) which is a literal.
Provability is based on the concept of a derivation (or proof) in D. A derivation is a
finite sequence P= (P(1), . . . ,P(n)) of tagged literals. Each tagged literal satisfies some
proof conditions. A proof condition corresponds to the inference rules corresponding
to one of the four kinds of conclusions we have mentioned above. P(1..i) denotes the
initial part of the sequence P of length i. Here we state the conditions for strictly and
defeasibly derivable conclusions (see [1] for the full presentation of the logic):
If P(i+1) = +∆q then
(1) q ∈ F , or
(2) r ∈ Rs[q], ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆a ∈ P(1..i).
If P(i+1) = +∂q then
(1) +∆q ∈ P(1..i), or
(2) (2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd [q]∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.2) −∆∼q ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) :−∂a ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd [q] ∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂a ∈ P(1..i) and t  s.
4 Dialogue Games in Defeasible Logic – A Symmetric Protocol
In [24] we presented a model for an argumentation game in DL using a basic symmetric
protocol for adversarial dispute. We parse a dialogue into defeasible rules utilizing time
of the dialogue as the time of the rule. In order to resolve the dispute, the agents take
turn in putting forward arguments from a private knowledge base, i.e., a finite set of
(defeasible) arguments in support of their claim. At each time step, an agent is allowed
to put forward any of its arguments (rules) that has precedence over any contradictory
defeasible rule of the previous steps.
In this symmetric protocol we assume that if at time t2 we have a valid rule w ∈ Rt2sd
which contradicts a defeasible rule s ∈ Rt1d of time t1 and t2 > t1 then the strength of w
is greater than s. The expression a@t denotes that the expression a being put forward
or upgraded at time t.
(w s)@t iff (w,s) ∈  or w ∈ Rt ′ [P], s ∈ Rt [¬P] where t ′ < t
A common public knowledge base holds the common knowledge, which is a the-
ory in defeasible logic. The sets of agreed common knowledge construct the theories
T1,T2, . . . ,Tn respectively as the undefeated defeasible rules from the previously adja-
cent step are strengthened into strict rules and the defeated defeasible rules are removed.
Thus, if P is the conclusion of a defeasible rule of the adjacent previous step ti−1, re-
gardless of its origin, the agreed common knowledge is created by strengthening the
status of rules from defeasible to strict in the adjacent next step ti+1 if:
∃r ∈ Rt ′d [P] t ′ < t ∀t ′′ : t ′ < t ′′ < t Rt
′′
sd [¬P] = /0 and ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆a@t
The proof procedures of the defeasible logic are applied to the critical literal at each time
step, thus determining the burden of proof and the outcome of the argumentation game.
The first theory T1 = ({},R1d ,) is created from the arguments (ARG1) presented by the
first player, and the second theory T2 = ({},R2d ,) is created through modifications of
T1 by the arguments (ARG2) presented by player 2. The transition rules from the first
theory to the second theory were devised as follows:
1. If r ∈ R1d and ∀s ∈ ARG2, ¬C(s) 6=C(r)∧¬C(s) /∈ A(r), then r ∈ R2d .
2. All rules of ARG2 are added to T2 as defeasible rule. Here we assume that ARG2
is valid and that a valid argument, by the above defined precedence relations, is
stronger than any contradictory argument of the previous step.
At time n, n> 2 theory Tn is created through modification of Tn−1 by arguments (ARGn)
of the player who has to play at that step. The rules for transition from Tn−1 to Tn are
1. If r ∈ Rn−1s then r ∈ Rns .
2. If r ∈ Rn−2d and ∀s ∈ ARGn−1,¬C(s) 6=C(r)∧¬C(s) /∈ A(r), then r ∈ Rns ; otherwise
r /∈ Rn. Here we should note that the player will not oppose its previous argument.
Thus, all unchallenged rules of time n−2 are upgraded as strict rules at time n.
3. If r ∈ Rn−1d and ∀s ∈ ARGn−1,¬C(s) 6=C(r)∧¬C(s) /∈ A(r), then r ∈ Rnd . Unchal-
lenged defeasible rules of time n−1 are added to Tn as defeasible rules.
4. All rules of ARGn−1 are added to Tn as defeasible rules. Here we assume that
ARGn−1 is valid and that a valid argument, by the above defined precedence re-
lations, is stronger than any contradictory argument of previous step.
The winning criteria for a basic game are devised as an agent to be winning if the claim
q is definitely proven +∆q at any time step. If an agent at any step of the game proves
+∂A the burden of production as well as persuasion of −∂A, or −∆A or +∆¬A or
+∂¬A are placed on the other party.
Using a symmetric protocol, a dispute between equally strong parties could be mod-
elled as an argumentation game and resolved accordingly. However, in many situations
ethical, moral or other reasons (cf., e.g., criminal litigation4) advocate for special con-
cerns to be taken on behalf of one of the parties. To accommodate such settings, asym-
metric protocols are required.
5 Dialogue Games in Defeasible Logic – An Asymmetric Protocol
Here we present an asymmetric model for adversarial argumentation games between
two parties: the Prosecutor and the Defendant. As in the symmetric protocol, we parse
the dialogue into defeasible rules utilizing time of the dialogue as the time of the rule.
Each agent has at its disposition a private knowledge base consisting of a finite set
of defeasible arguments in support of their claim (the critical literal). Initiated by the
prosecutor, the parties take turns in presenting their arguments. At each time step the
proof procedures are applied to the critical literal. The outcome of an argumentation
game is determined by the final stage of the game, whilst the intermediate stages are
illustrating the situation for the current situation. For common sense reasons, as an
argument put forward cannot be revoked from impacting the argumentation, we do not
allow for backtracking.
The winning criteria for a basic game are devised as an agent to be winning if the
claim q is definitely proven +∆q at any time step. However, analogously to the burden
of persuasion, which imposes a requirement of providing a justified (i.e., strongly de-
feating) argument for the issue on which the burden rests (based on rebutting defeat)
[21], we require of the prosecutor a strong defeat of any argument (including the criti-
cal literal) presented by the defendant. Thus, if the prosecutor at any step of the game
4 “Homo praesumitur bonus donec probetur malus” lat: Innocent until proven guilty. The adop-
tion of this presumption of innocence in many national statutes results in that the defendant of
a criminal litigation only is required to at most produce an exception to the accusation.
proves +∂A, the prosecutor still holds the burden to produce proof of +∆A in order
to win. For the defendant only a burden of production of an exception +∂¬A, (being
subsumed by −∂A, −∆A or +∆¬A) is imposed. If the defendant at any step of the
game proves the exception +∂¬A, the burden of persuasion placed on the prosecutor
necessitates the proof of +∆A (including −∂¬A) in order for the prosecutor to win.
In the symmetric protocol, regardless of its origin, time brings strengthening of
undefeated rules from defeasible to strict. Here we require that the strengthening of
rules originating from the prosecutor only occurs when the rule could be derived from
arguments already put forward by the defendant. In other cases, undefeated rules from
the previously adjacent step presented by the prosecutor remain as defeasible rules in
the common knowledge base. Defeated rules are removed at each step. As we do not
allow the prosecutor to repeat arguments and the arguments put forward have to strongly
defeat any arguments put forward by the defendant, the game will terminate.
In the symmetric protocol at each step any agent in turn to move can present an
argument if its strength is stronger than contradictory defeasible rules of the previous
steps. In our asymmetrical distribution of the burden of proof, the defendant is allowed
to present an argument that merely weakly defeats the argument of the prosecutor of the
previous steps. As consequence the defendant could remain with the same argument for
fulfilling his burden of production of an assumption +∂¬A as response to +∂A.
The strength of an argument is determined by either previously known superiority
relationships or validity of that rule. Adhering to the above presented syntax, we write
yi ∈ Rt jx |x ∈ {d,s,sd}. Here y is a rule identifier with the subscripts i ∈ {p,d} where p
means that the origin of the rule is the prosecutor and d means that the origin of the rule
is the defendant. In the following, unless needed, the indexing is left out for readability
reasons.
If ∀r ∈ Rtis [q] and ∀s ∈ Rtid [¬q], then (r  s)@ti
We consider that the rule strength of a strict rule is greater than the rule strength of a
defeasible rule.
(wd  sp)@t iff (wd ,sp) ∈  or sp ∈ Rt ′ [P] and wd ∈ Rt ′′ [¬P], where t ′ < t ′′ < t
For defeasible rules presented by the defendant we simply assume that if at time t2
we have a valid rule wd ∈ Rt2 which contradicts a defeasible rule sp ∈ Rt1 of time t1
and t2 > t1 then the strength of wd is greater than sp. This fits well with the burden
of persuasion being placed on the prosecutor. We utilize defeasible logic to determine
strength of a new rule presented by the players.
(sp  wd)@t iff (sp,wd) ∈  or wd ∈ Rt ′ [¬P] and sp ∈ Rt ′′ [P] and ∀a ∈ A(s) :
+∆a@t, where t ′ < t ′′ < t
else
(wd  sp)@t iff (wd ,sp) ∈  or wd ∈ Rt ′ [¬P] and sp ∈ Rt ′′ [P] and ∃a ∈ A(s) :
−∆a@t, where t ′ < t ′′ < t
As the prosecutor holds the burden of persuasion, we assume that unless the rule priority
is set, that only if at time t2 we have a valid rule sp ∈ Rt2 which contradicts a defeasible
rule wd ∈ Rt1 of time t1 and t2 > t1 and the rule presented by the prosecutor strongly
defeats the rule of the defendant then the strength of the argument sp of the prosecutor
is greater than the argument of the defendant wd . In all other situations the opposite
goes, thus rendering the strength of the argument sp of the prosecutor weaker than the
argument of the defendant wd .
In this asymmetric protocol the criteria for strengthening the rule strength of a de-
feasible rule to a strict rule are devised as follows:
∃r ∈ Rt ′d [P] t ′ < t ∀t ′′ : t ′ < t ′′ < t Rt
′′
sd [¬P] = /0 and ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆a@t
If P is the conclusion of a defeasible rule r ∈ Rt ′d of the adjacent previous step t ′ and the
rule was presented by the defendant then we can upgrade the rule status from defeasible
to strict in the next time step t if no counterarguments are presented by the prosecutor
at time t ′′. For tEven < tOdd < t
∃r ∈ RtOddd [P], Rt
Even′′
sd [¬P] = /0 and ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆a@t and
1) ∃r ∈ RtEvends [P] and ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆a@t, or
2) +∂ [P]@t f romRtEvends
However, if P is the conclusion of a defeasible rule r ∈ RtOddd of the adjacent previous
step tOdd and the rule was presented by the prosecutor then we can upgrade the rule
status from defeasible to strict in next step only in the case of no counterarguments being
presented by the defendant at the adjacently following time tEven and the defeasible
(or strict) rule r has been put forward by the defendant or the conclusion P follows
defeasibly from the defeasible or strict rules Rt
Even
ds presented by the defendant at the
adjacently following time tEven.
An argumentation game is initiated at time 1 by the prosecutor putting forward ar-
guments (ARG1) from its private knowledge into the common knowledge base to prove
its claim (critical literal) A. As the parties take turns in presenting their arguments, at
time 2 the defendant agent responds to the accusations. We allow arguments in the form
of valid defeasible rules being as strong or stronger than at least some rules of theory
T1. The common sets of argument construct the theories T1,T2,T3, . . . ,Tn respectively
where the subscripts indicate the time at which the common sets of argument are con-
structed. As all arguments in the private knowledge base of the agents are defeasible,
in the first two theories the common set of arguments consists only of defeasible rules
from both time 1 and time 2, according to the following transition rules:
Let the first theory T1 = ({},R1d ,) be created from arguments (ARG1), the op-
erative plea of prosecutor, and the second theory T2 = ({},R2d ,) be created through
modifications of T1 by arguments (ARG2) from the defendant. Now the transition rules
from the first theory T1 to the second theory T2 are as follows:
1. If r ∈ R1d and ∀s ∈ ARG2, ¬C(s) 6=C(r) ∧¬C(s) /∈ A(r), then r ∈ R2d .
2. All rules of (ARG2) are added to T2 as defeasible rules. Under the assumption of
(ARG2) be valid and that, by the above defined precedence relations, any valid ar-
gument from the defendant is stronger than its contradictory argument (from the
prosecutor) of the adjacent previous step. As all unchallenged rules of the prosecu-
tor are added to T2 as defeasible rules T2 now consists of all unchallenged rules of
the prosecutor and all arguments (ARG2) of the defendant.
At time n = 2m+ 1 (m > 0), theory Tn is created through modification of Tn−1 by
arguments (ARGn) of the prosecutor. Accounting for the heterogeneity of the parties
we capture the asymmetrical burden of proof by the following rules for transition from
theories Tn−1 to Tn:
1. If r ∈ R1d and ∀s ∈ ARGn−1,¬C(s) 6= C(r)∧¬C(s) /∈ A(r), and 1) r ∈ Rn−1d or 2)
Rn−1d `C(r), then r ∈ Rns .
2. If r ∈ Rn−2d and ∀s ∈ ARGn−1, ¬C(s) 6=C(r)∧¬C(s) /∈ A(r), then r ∈ Rnd . Here we
should note that, in contrast to the symmetric protocol, even though the defendant
has not actively challenged these arguments and the prosecutor will not oppose its
previous argument by the rules of the game, we find it to be a too strong presump-
tion to strengthen the rule status of these rules to strict rules. Thus, unless the ar-
gument is acknowledged by the defendant (see transition rule 1.), all unchallenged
rules of time n−2 of the prosecutor remain as defeasible rules at time n.
3. If r ∈ Rn−1d and ∀s ∈ ARGn,¬C(s) 6=C(r)∧¬C(s) /∈ A(r), then r ∈ Rnd . All unchal-
lenged defeasible rules of time n−1 (originating from the defendant) are added as
defeasible rules at time n.
4. If r ∈ Rn−1d and ∀s ∈ ARGn,¬C(s) =C(r)∧¬C(s) /∈ A(r), and r  s then r ∈ R3d .
For removal is required that all rules of the defendant have to be strongly defeated
by the prosecutor. Thus, also the defeasible rules of time n−1 (originating from
the defendant) of equal or stronger strength are added as defeasible rules at time n.
5. If r ∈ ARGn and ∀s ∈ Rn−1d , ¬C(s) 6=C(r)∧¬C(s) /∈ A(r), then r ∈ Rnd . All unchal-
lenged rules of (ARGn) are added to Tn as defeasible rules.
6. If r ∈ARGn and ∀s∈Rn−1d , ¬C(s) =C(r)∧¬C(s) /∈A(r) and r s, then r ∈Rnd . All
rules of (ARGn) that are of higher priority, i.e., strongly defeat the arguments of the
defendant are added to Tn as defeasible rules. Here due to the burden of production
of the prosecutor, all arguments added are required to either be unchallenged or
to strongly defeat all previous arguments of the defendant. This way, by putting
forward new arguments, the prosecutor could strengthen its claim.
As a result Tn consists of the unchallenged defeasible rules of Tn−2 of the prosecutor,
the unchallenged defeasible rules and the rules of by Tn−1 of the defendant that are chal-
lenged by (ARGn) but found equally strong or stronger, and the unchallenged defeasible
rules of the prosecutor from (ARGn).
At time n = 2m (m > 1), theory Tn is created through modification of Tn−1 by argu-
ments (ARGn) of the defendant. The transitions from Tn−1 to Tn are devised as follows:
1. If r ∈ Rn−1d and ∀s ∈ ARGn,¬C(s) 6=C(r)∧¬C(s) /∈ A(r), then r ∈ Rns . The defen-
dant will not oppose its previous argument by the rules of the game. Thus, all the
unchallenged defeasible rules Rn−1d are upgraded as strict rules, i.e., facts, at time
n.
2. If r ∈ Rn−1d and ∀s ∈ ARGn,¬C(s) 6=C(r)∧¬C(s) /∈ A(r), then r ∈ Rnd . All unchal-
lenged defeasible rules Rn−1d are added as defeasible rules at time n. As already
stated, the defendant cannot challenge her own rules presented in Rn−1d .
3. All rules of (ARGn) are added to Tn as defeasible rules. In contrast to arguments,
e.g., (ARGn−1) originating from the prosecutor, as (ARGn) originates from the de-
fendant we merely require that all rules of (ARGn) are valid and at least as strong
(or stronger) than any of its contradictory arguments presented by the prosecutor.
An Example – Presumption of Innocence The asymmetric model of argumentation
game defeasible logic is illustrated by elaboration on the example of [24]. Consider a
particular argumentation game between the prosecutor Alice and the defendant Bob.
Alice is trying to convict Bob by proving A and Bob is claiming ¬A. At each step they
maintain a current set of rules (CRt , where t is the time). Here a rule consists of its name
R′i (where R′i indicates that the rule belongs to the current set CRt as opposed to the
rules present in the private knowledge bases of the parties denoted by Ri), its antecedent
A(r), which is a finite set of literals, an arrow, its consequent C(r), which is a literal and
@tx|x∈ {1,2,3, . . . ,n} denotes the time of the rule, which is updated at each step. Alice
initiates the game at time t1 by presenting her first move as
R1 : /0⇒ B R2 : B⇒ A
This will generate two defeasible rules as R′1( /0⇒ B)@t1, R′2(B⇒ A)@t1. Thus at
time t1 CRt1=[R
′1, R′2] and we can prove +∂A@t1. Now at next time point, Bob gets
its chance to disprove A. At time t2, Bob presents the following argument,
R3 : /0⇒ D R4 : D⇒¬A
This will generate two new defeasible rules as R′3( /0⇒D)@t2 R′4(D⇒¬A)@t2. Now,
Bob only attacks R′2 presented by Alice at previous step by R′4 and R′2 is removed from
CRt2 . Note that as t2 > t1, the strength of R
′4 is greater than R′2 according to the strength
determination rule for the defendant. At time t2, R′1 remains unchallenged but as this
rule is not utilized even as a premise in the reasoning of Bob it does not commit Bob to
this rule, (leaving Bob the possibility to dismiss this rule by contesting it at a later time
or Alice to present evidence to strengthen this rule by the strength determination rule).
Thus, the rule remain in CRt2 as R
′1( /0⇒ B)@t2. This is in contrast to the symmetric
protocol where R′1 as unchallenged is changed to a strict rule R′1( /0→ B)@t2 (a fact)
regardless of its origin. Note that we change the time stamp of the rule from t1 to t2 to
indicate that it is member of CRt2 at time t2. Thus, CRt2 =[R
′1, R′3, R′4]. The proof at
time t2 is +∂¬A (which implies that we also have−∆ A as the latter rule R′4 is stronger
than R′2 in accordance to the first strength determination rule.
Next at time t3, in order to defeat the arguments presented by Bob, Alice presents
the following arguments:
R5 : B⇒¬D R6 : /0⇒ E R7 : E⇒ A
So the translated defeasible rules are R′5(B ⇒ ¬D)@t3, R′6( /0 ⇒ E)@t3, R′7(E ⇒
A)@t3. Now the CRt3 is [R
′1, R′3, R′4, R′6] as the rule R′4 is stronger than R′7 and
the rule R′3 is stronger than R′5 according to the transition rule as neither the argu-
ment R′7 nor R′5 can strongly defeat R′4 or R′3 respectively and thus they are removed.
So the proof at this time point remain +∂¬A. If Alice cannot present any additional
arguments strongly defeating R′4 in the next step the rule R′4 is strengthened into a
strict rule resulting in the proof of +∆¬A. Thus, in contrast to the symmetric protocol
example where Alice wins the game as she were able to upgrade the defeasible rules
supporting the proof of +∂A by use of the rule priority assumption in 5, she would need
the rule to be strongly defeated as e.g by addition of a rule R′i : E⇒¬D to prevent the
rule R′4 from being strengthened into a strict rule at time t4. As this is not the case, Bob
wins the game at time t4 and is acquitted from the criminal charge of A.
Another Example – Beyond Reasonable Doubt Consider a second argumentation
game between the prosecutor Alice and the defendant Bob. Alice is still trying to convict
Bob by proving A and Bob is claiming ¬A. Again Alice initiates the game at time t1 by
presenting her first move as
R1 : /0⇒ B R2 : F ⇒ A
This will generate two defeasible rules as R′1( /0⇒ B)@t1, R′2(F ⇒ A)@t1. Thus at
time t1 CRt1=[R
′1, R′2] and we have proof +∂A@t1. Now at next time point, Bob gets
its chance to disprove A. At time t2(t2 > t1), Bob presents the following argument,
R3 : E⇒ D R4 : B,D⇒¬A
This will generate two new defeasible rules as R′3(E ⇒ D)@t2, R′4(B,D⇒¬A)@t2.
Now, Bob only attacks R′2 presented by Alice at previous step by R′4 and R′2 is re-
moved from CR. As t2 > t1, the strength of R′4 is greater than R′2 according to the
strength determination rule for the defendant. Thus, CRt2 =[R
′1, R′3, R′4]. The proof at
time t2 is−∂ A, which includes that we also have−∆ A as the latter rule R′4 is stronger
than R′2.
Next at time t3, Alice presents the following arguments,
R5 : ¬E⇒¬D R6 : /0⇒¬E R7 : B⇒ A
The translated defeasible rules are R′5(¬E ⇒ ¬D)@t3, R′6( /0⇒ ¬E)@t3, R′7(B⇒
A)@t3. Now CRt3 =[R
′1, R′4, R′5, R′6, R′7] as R′3 is strongly defeated by R′5 and R′6
and thus, it is removed. At time t3, R′1 remains unchallenged and as it is utilized as a
premise in the reasoning of Bob and thus commits Bob to this rule (which is justified as
Bob could not be allowed to rely on not actively presented inconsistencies), presented
by the prosecutor Alice it is strengthened into a strict rule (i.e., a fact) as R′1( /0→B)@t3.
So the proof at this time point is +∂A as the rule is stronger according to the transition
rules. If Bob does not present valid arguments in the next step Alice wins the game as
from Bob’s argumentation her claim is corroborated.
6 Related Work
In this paper we augment the model of dialogue games in defeasible logic of [24]. The
work is based on ALIS [21], and we are inspired by [13] as we have separated the
knowledge of the players into (1) private knowledge and (2) public knowledge. The
common public knowledge forms the common set of arguments, which is a theory in
defeasible logic. As such our model in contrast to [21] provides a closer approximation
of argumentation games for the agent setting, as the agent could choose at what time
and which parts of its arguments (i.e., private knowledge) be disclosed to its opponent.
Substantial work have been done on argumentation games in the AI and Law-field.
[3] presents an early specification and implementation of an argumentation game based
on the Toulmin argument-schema without a specified underlying logic. [7] presented
The Pleadings Game as a normative formalization and fully implemented computational
model, using conditional entailment. The goal of the model was to identify issues in the
argumentation rather than as in our case elaborating on the status of the main claim.
The dialectic proof procedures presented by [6] focus on minimizing the culprit of
argumentation. The proof procedures are expressed as metalogic programs. Our use of
defeasible logic establishes a difference as to the syntactic limitations as the approach in
[6] is built on assumptions that are atomic, whereas in our framework the arguments are
expressible as rules of propositional defeasible logic, not being directly applicable in the
abstract argumentation framework underlying [5]. DiaLaw [15] is a two player game, in
which both players make argument moves. The model combines exchange of statements
and exchange of arguments, dealing with rhetorical as well as psychological issues of
argumentation. However, the main focus for the two players is to convince each other
rather than defeating an adversarial as in our case. The abstract argumentation systems
of [25,26] study arguments as the object of defeat. The results however are more related
to stable semantics than sceptical as in the defeasible logic utilized in our framework
and the study is devised as meta games for changing the rules of argumentation games.
Modelling argumentation games in defeasible logic has been addressed by [13,12,14].
[14], in contrast to our work, focuses on persuasion dialogues in a cooperative setting.
It includes in the process cognitive states of agents such as knowledge and beliefs, and
presents some protocols for some types of dialogues (e.g. information seeking, explana-
tion, persuasion). The main reasoning mechanism is based on basic defeasible logic (cf.
Section 3), while ignoring recent development in extensions of defeasible logic with
modal and epistemic operators for representing the cognitive states of agents [9,10].
[13] provides an extension of defeasible logic to include the step of the dialogue in
a way very similar to what we have presented in the paper. A main difference is that
the resulting mechanism just defines a metaprogram for an alternative computational
algorithm for ambiguity propagating defeasible logic while the logic presented here is
ambiguity blocking. In [12], the authors focus on rule sceptic characterizations of ar-
guments and propose the use of sequences of defeasible (meta) theories, while using
meta-reasoning (meta-rules or high level rules) to assess the strength of rules for the
theories at lower levels.
7 Conclusion
In this paper Defeasible Logic is used to capture an asymmetric protocol for argumen-
tation games. We have shown that our model provides for a closer approximation of
argumentation games for heterogeneous agent settings. The agent characteristics or the
agents’ relative importance in fulfilling the overall goal of the system could be captured,
while all the same the agent is allowed to argue its case in the best way it knows, e.g.
choosing at what time any subset of its arguments (i.e. private knowledge) be disclosed
to its adversary.
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